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The Early Sources of Forced Heirship;
Its History in Texas and Louisiana
JOSEPH DAINOW*
"There are certain provisions of the Civil Code of Louisi-
ana that are something more than mere laws; they may be
said to rise to the dignity of institutions. Among these are
the articles of the Code providing for what is known as the
doctrine of forced heirship."'
The question of forced heirship is one which has received
extensive and continued attention in practically all developed
legal systems. Strong public policies are always involved and a
great variety of conclusions have been reached. Furthermore, the
policies and rules within certain countries have changed from one
extreme to the other.2
Forced heirship has always been a part of the law of Louisi-
ana and as recently as 1921 it was given constitutional sanctifica-
tion and protection.3 In Texas, the influences worked in the
opposite direction. Forced heirship was a recognized institution
of the original law, but within a comparatively short time after
the entry of Texas into the Union it was abolished.4
It is proposed here to examine some relevant aspects of the
early sources of this institution in the Roman, Germanic and
Spanish laws. Of course, a civil law study, of forced heirship is
not complete without the law of France, but that part of the sub-
ject has been published elsewhere.5 Against this historical back-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Fenner, An Example of Homeric Nodding in Relation to the Reduction
of Donations Inter Vivos (1916) 1 So. L. Q. 129.
2. Cf. Dainow, Limitations on Testamentary Freedom in England (1940)
25 Corn. L. Q. 337; Dainow, Restricted Testation in New Zealand, Australia
and Canada (1938) 36 Mich. L. Rev. 1107; Dainow, Unrestricted Testation in
Quebec (1936) 10 Tulane L. Rev. 401.
3. La. Const. of 1921, Art. IV, § 16. See discussion Infra pp. 64, 67-69.
4. Texas Statutes, Act of July 24, 1856, chap. lxxxv. 4 Gammel, Laws of
Texas (1898) 423; Paschal's Digest of the Laws of Texas (2 ed. 1870) Art.
3868. See discussion infra pp. 56-57.
5. Dainow, Forced Heirship in French Law (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw
669.
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ground will be described briefly the developmental processes that
have taken place in Texas and Louisiana.
EARLY SOURCES
ROMAN LAW
To follow the developments in Roman law which culminated
in the limitation of a parent's testamentary freedom, it is neces-
sary to understand two early institutions. One is the organization
of the family, which was the basic unit of society and which
vested extensive power (patria potestas) in the head of that
family (paterfamilias). The other is the custom of continuing the
care and worship of the sacra, the family cult to the individual
household gods, from one generation to the next by the succes-
sive heirs." The familia and the sacra were so constituted and
they functioned in such a manner that their influence was re-
flected in many phases of the legal system.
Familia
The early Roman family consisted of the paterfamilias and
all those who by an agnatic (male) relationship were under his
power. All rights and property vested only in the pater, even
those newly acquired by other members of the family. During
the very early period of Roman legal history, the powers of the
pater extended even to the extreme limit of life and death. Under
such a social order with such legal institutions there could be no
room for any concept of testamentary restrictions on the parent.
The children were called sui heredes, which is sometimes defined
as heirs to themselves and implies co-ownership with the pater,
but this definition may refer back to a much more primitive
period. If the pater died intestate the children were first in line
to inherit, but his absolute power of disposition gave him unre-
stricted freedom to distribute his estate in legacies.7
Sacra
The continuance of the family sacra was a major considera-
tion with the Romans and they organized their other institutions
with a view to insuring it. If a man had no child, he was per-
mitted for this reason to adopt one (arrogatio), and the rights of
inheritance which were bestowed incidentally upon the adopted
6. Cf. Maine, Early Law and Custom (1907) 78, 120.
7. Buckland, A Manual of Roman Private Law (1925) 60 et seq., 212;
Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman Law (1921) 102 et seq.
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child constituted their earliest method of performing the disposi-
tive function of a will8
Testation
Early Will
In the light of the foregoing, the purpose of the first wills
was the institution of an heir to carry on the family tradition
rather than the disposition of property. It was regarded as a
great misfortune for a man to die without an heir who would
continue his familia and carry on the sacra.
Some writers believe that complete freedom of testation and
the power of disinheritance existed right from the Twelve Tables;9
on the other hand, some are of the opinion that although there
was power of disposition by legacy, testation consisted of the
institution of an heir and came into existence as late as the second
century B.c.10 For the present purpose, this is not an important
issue, because in either case there was no restriction on a parent's
power of disposition and the whole estate could be given away.
There is no doubt that the institution of an heir was not only
the primary function of the will but furthermore that without it
no will was valid." And to anticipate the possibility that the in-
stituted heir might not enter, there were often named one or
more substitutes (substitutio vulgaris). Likewise, a father was
permitted in his will to provide an heir for his minor son, to take
effect in the event of the child's death under the age at which he
could legally make his own will (substitutio pupillaris).
Restrictions on Legacies and Bequests
Despite these precautions, there must have resulted many
unfortunate instances, as it were, of a succession devolving intes-
tate because there was no means of assuring entry by the insti-
tuted heir. In view of the obligations to pay debts and to carry
out the testamentary instructions, the heir often refused to enter
because where the testator had consumed most or all of the assets
8. Cf. Maine, Ancient Law (new ed. 1930) 214. See also infra note 11.
9. Buckland, Manual, 226; Girard, Manuel Elmentaire de Droit Romain
(8 ed. 1929) 842, 905.
10. 1 Cuq, Les Institutions Juridiques chez les Romains (1904) 258; Cuq,
Manuel des Institutions Juridiques des Romains (1917) 681, 682, 706.
11. The institution of an heir by the early, comitial will served the same
purpose as procuring an heir by arrogatio (adoption). Thus the pontiff s, who
never tolerated an arrogatio by a man who had sons of his own, similarly
opposed (at first) the making of a comitial will by a paterfamilias who had
uui heredes. Cornil, Ancien Droit Romain (1930) 106. Cornil also states that
the testament served the additional purpose of keeping ancestral property in
the family by preventing parcellation. Id. at 71.
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of his estate in legacies the remaining burden was undesirable.
This inference seems to be borne out by the repeated efforts to
curtail excessive legacies.
An early law (lex Furia Testamentaria) set a limit to indi-
vidual legacies by imposing a serious penalty on any person who
accepted a larger amount, but there was no limitation on the
number of legacies; and in 168 B.C. the lex Voconia guaranteed to
the heir at least as much as any other beneficiary.'2 However,
these measures were ineffective to assure entry by the heir. The
problem was solved only when the famous lex Falcidia, in 40 B.C.,
finally reserved a minimum of one-fourth (falcidian portion) of
the estate for the heir; 3 excessive legacies were reduced propor-
tionately." The heir may have been any person capable of in-
heriting but it can be presumed safely that one or more of the
testator's children were named in most cases. The determining
purpose of perpetuating the family sacra obviously implies a
preference for the real instead of artificial family successors.
After the establishment of fldeicommissa early in the Empire,
a testator could place charges or trusts upon his heirs and upon
other beneficiaries under the will and it became customary to
use this means for the purpose of making bequests to persons
who were not legally capable of benefiting directly under the will.
Since children (sui heredes) were always the most qualified for
heirship they found themselves overburdened with these extra-
testamentary bequests which at first were not subjected to any
rules or limitations. As a result the nominal heir was often only
an intermediary for the person who really received the succession.
To cover up the gaps, a senatusconsultum Trebellianum (56 A.D.)1 5
provided that actions (litigation) concerning the estate could also
be transferred by the heir to the real beneficiary. The heir was
thus protected against undue personal liability but there was still
no inducement to assure his entry. It therefore became necessary
to impose upon fideicommissa the same restrictions as for legacies,
and the senatusconsultum Pegasianum (73 A.D.) provided a reser-
12. Girard, op. cit. supra note 9, at 975. Cf. Buckland, Text-Book, 338i n.
9; Buckland, Manual, 212-213. (The date of the lex Furia Testamentaria Is
placed as somewhere between 203 and 168 B.c.).
13. Girard, op. cit. supra note 9, at 976; Buckland, Text-Book, 338.
14. These laws have also been interpreted as measures of public policy
for the taxation of testamentary succession. The inference is not supported
by many writers, and must be considered in connection with the theory that
freedom of testation was only established in the second century B.c. (See
authorities cited supra note 10). 2 Cuq, Les Institutions Juridiques chez lea
Romains (1920) 659, n. 3.
15. Buckland, Text-Book, 351; Girard, op. cit. supra note 9, at 989.
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vation of one-fourth of the estate for the heir.1 8 If the heir still
refused, he could be compelled by a magistrate to enter, taking
no profit and incurring no risk. In the sixth century, Justinian
assimilated legacies and fideicommissa, and the same rules were
made applicable to both.
Whereas the original purpose of the will had been to perpetu-
ate the sacra, the relationship changed to the other extreme
when, in order to keep up the sacra, restrictions had to be placed
upon the very testation which'it had helped bring into existence.
By way of inverse return, the increasing importance of testamen-
tary bequests may have had some bearing upon the gradual de-
crease in importance of the family sacra.
At first, it had been the testator's greatest concern to provide
for the perpetuation of the family sacra. Later, it was the state
which had to protect this institution in spite of the testator's in-
difference. Did the state consider that the need for the sacra was
strong enough to warrant the creation of new safeguards for its
assured continuance? Or were these measures taken merely to
obtain effect as far as possible for the testator's wishes, which
would be upset if the will should lapse for want of entry by the
heir? The former would seem to be the more probable inference,
because while the state might have an interest in the stability of
the family as the basic unit of its social and political organization,
it would not have any interest in giving effect to the excessive
legacies of a testator. In any event it is fairly obvious, from the
nature and sequence of these developments, that the interest least
considered was that of the heir. And to the children, as such, no
consideration at all was given.
Direct Restrictions in Favor of Children
At the same time, there were also two direct restrictions upon
the powers of testation, more specifically in favor of children and
exclusively in their interest. The first was in the rules of exhere-
datio which subjected disinherison to extremely strict formali-
ties,17 the second was in the querela inofficiosi testamenti which
went a step further and directly limited the testator's power of
disinheritance. 18
Exheredatio. A man's right to dispose of his property as he
pleased was at least as old as the Twelve Tables, and it was im-
16. Buckland, Text-Book, 352; Girard, op. cit. supra note 9, at 990.
17. Buckland, Text-Book, 318 et seq.; Girard, op. cit. supra note 9, at 903.
18. Buckland, Text-Book, 324 et seq.; Girard, op. cit. supra note 9, at 913
et seq.
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possible to change or contradict the jus civile. However, from the
rules which followed, it can be inferred without doubt that the
Romans disfavored the unjustified disinherison of children. The
early jurists contrived to introduce the legal fiction19 of leaving
the jus civile unchanged while a very severe formality was im-
posed for the institution or disinherison of sui heredes. Failure
to comply with these rules caused the nullity or the ineffective-
ness of the will. The general disapproval of disinherison found
expression in this attempt to discourage it.
The reason for this disapproval lies in some phase of the con-
cept that the children (and other sui heredes) were so closely
connected with the inheritance (hereditas) in a sort of dormant
ownership,20 or a more primitive condition of common ownership
of group property,21 that while the paterfamilias did have the
power to disinherit he could exercise it only with absolute ex-
plicitness.2 2
A more equitable procedure for the omitted heir to make his
claim was established by the praetors in the bonorum possessio
contra tabulas.2 1 Further simplification by Justinian 24 made no
substantial change in the general principles or in the rules of
formality for the disinherison of children. Although strictly a
matter of form, the rules of exheredatio directly affected the test-
amentary devolution of property; however, there was still no
general assurance that provision would always be made for the
children.
It is of interest to note that, as the logical consequence of re-
quiring a suus heres to be specifically instituted or disinherited,
the birth of a child after the making of the will or after the death
of the testator caused the will to fail. At first, it was impossible
to institute or disinherit a person not in existence, so that the will
inevitably had to fail.25 Although subsequently it became permis-
19. A "legal fiction" signifies "any assumption which conceals, or effects
to conceal, the fact that a rule of law has undergone alteration, its letter
remaining unchanged, its operation being modified." Maine, op. cit. supra
note 8, at 32.
20. Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to Roman Law (1932) 252.
21. Girard, op. cit. supra note 9, at 904.
22. The conclusion that the rules of disinhersion must have existed from
the earliest times is reached by Girard, op. cit. supra note 9, at 905, but this
is strongly contested by Cuq, loc. cit. supra note 10, and less vehemently by
Maine, op. cit. supra note 8, at 242-243.
23. Buckland, Text-Book, 321 et seq.; Girard, op. cit. supra note 9, at 909
et seq.
24. Buckland, Text-Book, 323; Girard, op. cit. supra note 9, at 912.
25. Buckland, Text-Book, 309 et seq.; Girard, op. cit. supra note 9, at 907
et seq.; Sandars, The Institutes of Justinian (1905) 2.13.1.2.
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sible to institute or disinherit these postumi in anticipation, it
nevertheless remains of particular interest that the first reserva-
tion beyond the power of the testator was in favor of the after-
born or posthumous pretermitted child.26
Querela inofficiosi testamenti. This institution did establish
a direct limitation on the testator's freedom; it assured a provi-
sion for the children and for other members of the immediate
family despite proper but unjust disinherison in the will. The
querela was a later development which became established to-
wards the end of the Republic (probably during the second cen-
tury B.C.) and came as a result of an increasingly progressive
social attitude. The growing disapproval of unjust disinherison
of children called for some protection against such eventualities;
the hardship and injustice must have accumulated a tremendous
force to overcome the immobility of the jus civile. Although this
was not changed, there was developed a new praetorian equity"
based on the principle that a man had a moral duty toward cer-
tain close relatives, most of all toward his children: if he disin-
herited them without cause it was contrary to natural duty and
sentiment of affection (offlcium pietatis).28 The praetor therefore
took it upon himself to carry out that duty for the testator, and
since this proceeding brought unfavorable reflection upon the
latter it may be inferred that he tried to prevent it by making a
more judicious will.29
The querela consisted of a complaint"0 made by the heir un-
26. Cf. Dainow, Inheritance by Pretermitted Children (1937) 32 Ill. L. Rev.
1, 10-11.
27. "The next instrumentality by which the adaptation of law to social
wants is carried on I call Equity, meaning by that word any body of rules
existing by the side of the original civil law, founded on distinct principles
and claiming incidentally to supersede the civil law in virtue of a superior
sanctity inherent in those principles. The Equity, whether of the Roman
Praetors or of the English Chancellors, differs from the Fictions which in
each case preceded it, in that the interference with law is open and avowed."
Maine, op. cit. supra note 8, at 34.
28. A suggested fiction of the testator's insanity may have come from
the Greek law. Sohm, The Institutes (transl. by Ledlie 1907) 556, n. 6.
The old idea of common ownership of the family estate has been indicated
as an additional underlying principle of the querela by Buckland (Text-Book,
325), but this has been denied by Girard, op. cit. supra note 9, at 913.
29. Cf. 3 Jhering, Etudes Compldmentaires de L'Esprit du Droit Romain
(transl. by deMeulenaire 1886) 193.
30. There is no complete agreement as to the exact nature and form of
the proceeding. The querela may have been the basis for a petitio hereditatis
or a preliminary investigation which preceded it, or may have been an inde-
pendent action. See Buckland, Text-Book, 324, n. 6; Cuq, Manuel des Insti-
tutions Juridiques des Romains, 712, n. 1; Girard, op. cit. supra note 9, at
913 et seq.; 3 Jhering, op. cit. supra note 29, at 344; Jobbe-Duval, 28 Nouvelle
Revue Historique (1904) 576; 31 id. (1907) 755 et seq.
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justly disinherited or (in the later law) inadequately provided
for in the will, and was permitted only as a last resort in cases
where the complainant had no other means of redress. At first, a
single complainant would totally displace a single instituted heir
as a result of the will being declared void, but in due course it
was established that a proper complainant should get a reason-
able share of the estate without completely upsetting the will. It
was probably after the lex Falcidias that the complainant's por-
tion under the querela was definitely fixed at one quarter of what
he would have received on intestacy, and if the will gave him less
or nothing at all the court would see that he received his due
share.
If there were several claimants, each one's share was so little
that the institution hardly served its purpose. Consequently,
more consideration was given to this numerical aspect of the
problem and Justinian's reforms82 increased the legal portion to
one-third of the estate if there were four or fewer children and
to one-half of the estate if there were five or more. This share
was called the pars legitima, and the rules governing it consti-
tuted a material basis for the development of the l6gitime in
mediaeval laws and customs and of the forced heirship in modern
codes.
GERMANIC LAW
The background of the Germanic inheritance system83 is like-
wise linked to certain fundamental institutions: the family group
which developed from a primitive social organization, and the
concept of private property which emerged from the earlier col-
lective group ownership.
Sib (Sippe): Family
Within the period of recorded Germanic history, the oldest
known type of association was the sib . 4 This grouping was based
on blood relationship and presumably developed out of an exten-
sive patriarchal household community. Membership or kinship
may have been determined originally on the agnatic principle of
descent from a common tribal male ancestor, but the cognatic
(blood) relationship was recognized in very early times.
31. Supra note 13.
32. Novella XVIII. Eighteenth New Constitution "Concerning the legal
portions .. " 16 Scott, The Civil Law (1932) 95 et seq.
33. The material for this section on Germanic law is taken mostly from
Huebner, A History of Germanic Private Law, 4 Continental Legal History
Series (1918) and the citations are therefore minimized.
34. Id. at 114 et seq.
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The sib was the germ of all associational life-group person-
ateness. As a unit it constituted an association of equal family
heads together with the members of their individual households.
Each household was composed of the two generations of parents
and children, and within it the family head (Hausherr) enjoyed
very extensive authority. Thus, while the sib formed an agrarian
union and was important in the military and judicial organiza-
tions, it was also the centre of all social and legal relations. In
contrast to the Roman family, which it otherwise resembled,
there was no patriarchal head but only a union in which all adult
male members, heads of households, were equal fellows.
During the Middle Ages the sib evolved in different places
through various forms of village community, and was always
organized on a principle of collective ownership. This continued
until the nineteenth century.
Ownership
The concept of absolute ownership" was known from the
very earliest times, but this was collective ownership vested in
the group which alone enjoyed legal personateness. In turn, the
collective ownership of land inevitably tended to perpetuate
group organization as the basis of society. Under these circum-
stances, there could have been no real system of inheritance be-
cause the death of one member of a group caused no change in
the collective ownership; the association had the perpetual per-
sonateness of a modem corporation.
Regardless of the differences in environmental conditions,
private property eventually emerged in practically all legal sys-
tems. But as incident to the process, there remained traces of the
distinctive features of their respective historical backgrounds. In
the Germanic law, this background included the sib and the other
group organizations, and it accounted for the numerous and con-
tinued restrictions on private property.
The private ownership of chattels evolved earlier than that of
land, because chattels were the subject of a more exclusive per-
sonal interest. Although private ownership of both chattels and
land was derived from the collective ownership of the sib through
the intermediate stages of the manorial and feudal village com-
munities of the Middle Ages, it was difficult to conceive of a com-
plete freedom of ownership of land. Thus there always persisted
35. Id. at 225 et seq. (land), 425 et seq. (chattels), 694 et seq. (inheri-
tance).
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numerous restrictions 6 on the ownership of land: by reason of
vicinage or of lordship, in the interest of the state, and in favor of
other individuals or groups.
Restrictions on Ownership
Of more particular interest for the present inquiry are the
restrictions upon private property derived from the collective
ownership of the group and existing in favor of other members of
the family. 7
(a) The most important of these restrictions was the one
which prevented alienation because of the co-rights of certain
relatives or members of the same group. These "rights of expect-
ancy" applied both to land and to chattels, and being derived
from the community of collective hand (Gesamte Hand) they
made it impossible for the head of the household to dispose of
anything by individual act. Later, when he did acquire some
rights of independent disposition (Freitheilsrechte), he could not
prejudice the rights of expectancy of the other members who
were entitled to rely upon inheriting the indisposable portion of
the estate, the fraction varying in different systems.
(b) By the "right of co-alienation" the next heir was entitled
to cooperate formally in any act of disposition made by the owner.
An inter vivos alienation of land without his consent was invalid
because he had a real right of expectancy with regard to the
property. In the Hansa cities, the right of co-alienation led almost
directly to the heir's compulsory portion, or Pflichttheil; in other
places, it weakened into the right of pre-emption.
(c) The rights of expectancy and of co-alienation excluded
consideration of the interests of the owner and worked harsh re-
sults; and even when these rights became relaxed, the heirs were
still given primary consideration by the "right of retractive pur-
chase," a pre-emption in preference to an outsider. However,
such right could be exercised only in the case of a sale and sub-
ject to the payment of the price offered (or the refund to the pur-
chaser of the price paid).
This deference to the co-rights of heirs kept property intact
and in the family. When the solidary character of landed estates
was threatened by the inclination to take advantage of the newer
economic interests at the end of the Middle Ages, the numerous
36. Id. at 259 et seq.
37. Id. at 304-312, 393 et seq.
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kinds of pre-emption rights still manifested the extensive and
continuing influence of the original collective ownership.
(d) After the thirteenth century a very important restraint
on ownership-usually in favor of children-consisted of the va-
rious systems of "entails," statutory and consensual, which pro-
hibited both alienation inter vivos and disposition mortis causa.
Very often the whole estate devolved upon the eldest male and
thereby remained intact, because the determining interests were
to keep the property in the family and to retain the strength of
the nobility. Although an advantage was conferred upon the
children, in effect they were only the incidental beneficiaries of a
life interest 8 because this benefit was the means toward the end
and not the end itself.
In the eighteenth and particularly in the nineteenth cen-
turies, the restrictions on ownership were generally regarded as
burdensome to commerce and many of them were abolished. But
those in favor of certain close relatives stood their ground firmly.
The Development of Testation and its Limits
Collective Ownership-Adoption
The early succession laws, based on blood kinship and fresh
from collective ownership, excluded all testamentary disposition.
And when a man had no natural heir to succeed him, the ap-
pointment of an artificial heir was more accurately a matter of
adoption in which the popular assembly had to cooperate.
This was similar to the Roman institution of arrogatio despite
the fact that the Roman and Germanic developments came from
the totally different bases of freedom and absence of testation
respectively. In one case, adoption was a means of serving the
interests of the family, the inheritance being incidental; and in
the other, adoption into the family was a method of selecting a
beneficiary.89
Private Property
In the old Germanic law, after the evolution of private prop-
erty in personal chattels, such as clothes, weapons, horses, food-
stuffs and so forth, the religious belief of another life in the next
38. Some jurists (referred to id. at 309) considered that the ownership
of property was vested in the family as a perpetual legal entity, but Huebner
follows the view of a restricted ownership in each holder (id. at 310).
39. Cf. the Frankish affatomie, and the Lombard garethinx. Huebner,
op. cit. supra note 33, at 740 et seq. See also Brissaud, A History of French
Private Law, 3 Continental Legal History Series (1912) 624, 684.
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world gave rise to the custom of burying or cremating these ob-
jects with the dead man so that they could serve his needs in the
beyond. The objects so given to the decedent in farewell came to
be identified as the "dead's part" (Todtentheil).10 In those com-
munities which had progressed beyond the larger group organiza-
tion and had established the two generation family as the social
unit, the other two thirds of the decedent's property devolved
upon the widow and the children respectively.
In time, the dead's part came to be regarded not only as those
personal objects used to provide for the material needs of the
decedent in the next world, but also as the share of his estate in
which he had an exclusive interest. As such, the institution was
found in many parts of the continent during the Middle Ages,"1
and this led to the right of disposition in anticipation of death.
Under the influence of the widespread Christian custom of utiliz-
ing the dead's part as a gift to the Church pro salute animae, this
spiritual provision for the next world replaced the material pro-
vision of the older system. Thus, the Church exerted a powerful
and universal influence in establishing and extending the power
of testamentary disposition.42 Many legal historians suspect that
the use of the dead's part pro salute animae contained the germs
of the mediaeval will throughout Europe.43
Mediaeval Will: Freitheil, Pflichttheil
The evolution of this mediaeval testament in Germany was not
free from the limitations within which it had come into existence.
Some of the old restrictions on alienation still remained, and the
testator acquired rights of disposition mortis causa only over his
Freitheil or free portion. With the aid of the Church this was
40. Brunner Der Todtentheil in Germanischen Rechten (1898) 19 Zeit-
schrift der Savigny Stiftung, Germ. Abt. p. 107; Huebner, op. cit. supra note
33, at 742 et seq.; Dainow, The Dead's Part (1935) 29 Ill. L. Rev. 1098.
41. Brunner, supra note 40; Caillemer, The Executor in England and on
the Continent, 3 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History (1909) 746,
754, n. 1.
42. Huebner, op. cit. supra note 33, at 306, 742; Brissaud, op. cit. supra
note 39, at 625, 691; 2 Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law
(2 ed. 1899) 339-340, 15, Encyclopedia of the Laws of Scotland (Green, 1930)
621-622, vo. Wills and Succession.
43. Huebner, op. cit. supra note 33, at 742, 746, 750; Brissaud, op.. cit.
supra note 39, at 625; 2 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note 42, at 314.
Brunner's view (supra note 40) that the testamentary Freitheil developed from
the Todtentheil is not accepted by Rietschel, Der Todtentheil in Germanis-
chen Rechten (1911) 32 Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung, Germ. Abt. p. 297.
However, the latter opinion is in turn refuted by the most authoritative
writers. See Gardner, The Origin and Nature of the Legal Rights of Spouses
and Children in the Scottish Law of Succession (1927) 39 Juridical Rev. 209,
313, 339.
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increased at the expense of the heir's rights in expectancy. The
indisposable part of the estate was called Pflichttheil, or the com-
pulsory portion which was reserved for children and other close
relatives, and over this the testator had no power of disposition.4
Reception of Roman Law; Comparisons
Culminating a gradual movement of three or four centuries,
the final step in the "Reception" of the Roman law took place at
the close of the fifteenth century, when the Imperial Chamber
of Justice was established and its judges were instructed to
recognize Roman law as the common law of the Empire.45 This
reception of Justinian's Corpus Juris was a matter of historical
necessity; ". . . it was the best means of providing the innumer-
able political bodies of the so-called Empire with a common law
which was abreast of the requirements of a modern capitalistic
economy, of extensive trade relations, and of the growing power
of territorial sovereigns."46
With all this, the Germanic laws of inheritance remained the
expression of the general conditions and views of a primitive and
unindividualistic society. Consequently, in contrast to the Roman
law, legal succession was given precedence over testamentary
succession, and intestacy was the rule rather than the exception.4 7
From the two widest extremes, and necessarily developing in
opposite directions under totally different environmental condi-
tions, the Roman law and the Germanic law reached similar re-
sults regarding the limitations of a parent's testamentary free-
dom.
SPANISH LAW
The history of Spanish law is long and involved and reflects
the Roman, Visigothic, Mohammedan and Christian influences
which determined the political history of the country. Codes and
compilations were relatively numerous but uncoordinated. Only
a few of the main points relating directly to the subject of forced
heirship will be mentioned here.
In Spain, 48 the history of forced heirship presents an interest-
44. Cf. Huebner, op. cit. supra note 33, at 305-308, 749-753.
45. A General Survey of Events, Sources, Persons and Movements in
Continental Legal History, 1 Continental Legal History Series (1912) 366;
Huebner, op. cit. supra note 33, at 16 et seq.
46. Vinogradoff, Introduction to Huebner, op. cit. supra note 33, at xxxiii.
47. Huebner, op. cit. supra note 33, at 697.
48. General Survey, op. cit. supra note 45, at 587, 594 et seq., 617 et seq.;
1 Alcubilla, Codigos Antiguos de Espagna (1885) 33, 123, 575, 722, 723; 3
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ing development as a result of the Germanic and Roman tradi-
tions meeting again, as they did in France,49 in the same field. The
Visigothic concept of exclusive family ownership left no room for
any dispositions to the prejudice of presumptive heirs. The first
general code, the Fuero Juzgo, was compiled during the latter
part of the seventh century (654-694 A.D.) and was based largely
on Germanic traditions. However, the social and religious in-
fluences procured for a testator the faculty of disposing of one-
fifth of his estate in favor of the Church or other pious works, and
it was further provided that the father could dispose of as much
as one-third if such excess was for the betterment (mejores) of
tome of his children. 50
The Fuero Real (1254 A.D.) 1 retained the same rules. But
Las Siete Partidas (1256-1265 A.D.) 5 2 was compiled under much
stronger Roman influences, which were then spreading through-
out the continent, and the testator's freedom of disposition was
greatly increased. Adopting Justinian's scheme, four or fewer
children were entitled to a l6gitime of one-third of the estate,
five or more to one-half.
The later compilations58 of the Laws of Estilo (1295-1312
A.D.), Laws of Toro (1505 A.D.), Nueva Recopilacion (1567 A.D.),
and Novisima Recopilacion (1805 A.D.), seem to have chosen
the system of the Fuero Juzgo and the Fuero Real, so that the
l6gitime of children was usually four-fifths of the estate, with the
possibility of the testator's freedom being increased to one-third
for betterment purposes.
In the Civil Code of Spain 54 there is a combination and
compromise of the various older elements. Thus, the l~gitime of
Barrachina, Derecho Foral Espagnol (1912) 492, 496; Esriche, Diccionario
Razonado de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia (1868) verbo Legitima, 1196, 1197;
Gregorio Lopez, Las Siete Partidas (1789) 6.1.17, n. 10, and 4.16.8, n. 5;
6 Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espanol (6 ed. 1932) 227 et seq.; 6
Roman, Estudios de Derecho Civil (2 ed. 1910) vol. 2, 753 et seq.; Scott, Las
Siete Partidas (Eng. transl. 1931) 5.4.8, 6.1.17, 6.2.1, 6.7.10, 6.8.1,5; 5 Valverde,
Tratado de Derecho Civil Espanol (3 ed. 1926) 208 et seq. See also in general:
Vance, The Background of Hispanic-American Law; Legal Sources and
Juridical Literature of Spain (1937); Walton, The Civil Law of Spain and
Spanish America (1900).
49. Cf. Dainow, Forced Heirship in French Law (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW
REvi5W 669, 670-675.
50. Fuero Juzgo, 4.5.1.
51. Fuero Real, 3.5.10.
52. Las Siete Partidas, 6.1.17. Cf. Justinian, Novella XVIII; 16 Scott, op.
cit. supra note 32, at 95 et seq.
53. Las Leyes del Estilo, 214; Leyes de Toro, 17 et seq., 26, 28; Novisima
Recopilacion, 10.6.1-10, 10.20.8,9.
54. Arts. 806-810, Civil Code of Spain (1889).
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children consists of two-thirds of the estate, leaving the father
free to dispose of one-third in any way he wishes. But he may
further dispose of another third "in order to apply it as a better-
ment" to some of the children.
TEXAS
The background of the legal history of Texas was Spanish.
Forced heirship was in operation as a matter of course. As part
of the Spanish law which was originally in effect,5 5 a parent
had the right to dispose (inter vivos or mortis causa) of only
one-fifth of his estate to strangers, and of one-third if such dis-
positions were made in favor of some of his children. Parents
as forced heirs received two-thirds of the estate; brothers and
sisters were not so favored unless the testator had instituted an
infamous person as heir to their prejudice.
It may be that Texas was more of a pioneer state than Louisi-
ana, and that the roots of the civil law were not as strongly im-
bedded in its traditions. As long as it remained a Spanish set-
tlement (1682-1827) or a part of the Mexican federation (1827-
1836) there was no change in this law. But with the establish-
ment of the Republic a new phase began. In the meeting between
the civil law and the adjacent common law influences, the per-
vasive effects of the latter seemed to spread quickly.
On December 18, 1837, a statute" was passed providing that
only legitimate descendants should be forced heirs. About two
years later, the Wills Act of January 28, 1840,'5 increased the
parent's disposable portion to one-fourth, and listed a number of
legal causes for disinheritance. However, this was only a testa-
mentary restriction; the liberty of disposition inter vivos was
untrammelled.58
In one case,5" the court lamented the dearth of positive law
on this subject, but reached the same just and equitable result
as the civil law rule that if a child received benefits during the
55. Hagerty v. Hagerty's Exe'rs, 12 Tex. 456 (1854); Crain v. Crain, 17
Tex. 81 (1856). Cf. La. Civil Code of 1808, 111.2.19, p. 212, infra note 75. For
direct references to the old Spanish law, see text supported by notes 48-54,
supra; see also note 76, infra.
56. 1 Gammel, Laws of Texas (1898) 1448; Hartley, Digest of the Laws
of Texas (1850) § 3251.
57. 2 Gammel, Laws of Texas (1898) 341; Hartley, A Digest of the Laws
of Texas (1850) §§ 3263, 3265.
58. Except in fraud of the children's legitimate share. Crain v. Crain,
17 Tex. 81 (1856).
59. Parker v. Parker, 10 Tex. 83 (1853).
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lifetime of the testator, he must collate them in order to claim
the legitimate share as a forced heir. An excessive disposition
was not null but merely reducible,60 and the legitimate share
was received free from any testamentary charges or encum-
brances. 1 However, the claim was personal to the forced heir,
and it could be lost by express or implied renunciation.
6 2
The Rejection of Forced Heirship in Texas
In 1840 the great body of Spanish law was repealed, 68 and
after Texas entered the Union in 1846 the invading common law
influence became stronger and more expansive. There does not
seem to have been any open conflict between the two legal sys-
tems because these adjustments were taking place without re-
sistance. The institution of forced heirship did manage to survive
for a while, but its fate was sealed and on July 24, 1856, it was
finally abolished.64
Why forced heirship disappeared while the civil law in-
stitution of community property remained cannot be answered
with certainty. However, it would appear that whereas the active
part played by the wife of the pioneer was certainly in keeping
with the concept of their acquisitions becoming community prop-
erty,', the individualistic spirit of a pioneer country was not in
sympathy with restrictions on the rights of ownership. 6 This
victory in Texas of the common law principle of testamentary
freedom 67 was similar to the result reached in almost all the
other instances where this conflict arose, as indicated later.6 8
60. Charle v. Saffold, 13 Tex. 94 (1854).
61. Budd v. Fisher, 17 Tex. 423 (1856).
62. Portis v. Cummings, 14 Tex. 171 (1855).
63. Crain v. Crain, 17 Tex. 81, 91 (1856).
64. An Act Supplementary to the Act of January 28, 1840, concernnig
Wills, and authorizing Persons to dispose of their Estate by Will, Act of
July 24, 1856, chap. lxxxv. 4 Gammel, Laws of Texas (1898) 423; Paschal's
Digest of the Laws of Texas (2 ed. 1870) Art. 3868. (Probably as a result of
an error in Paschal's Digest [1 ed. 1866] this act is sometimes cited as of
January 24, 1856). See also Connecticut v. Davis, 33 Tex. 203 (1870).
65. Tex. Stat. (Vernon, 1936) art. 4619. The community property system
also prevails in a number of other western states: Arizona, California, Idaho,
New Mexico, Nevada and Washington. Daggett, The Community Property
System of Louisiana (1931) 3; Daggett, General Principles of Succession on
Death in Civil Law (1937) 11 Tulane L. Rev. 399, note*. Oklahoma joined
the group in 1939. Daggett, The Oklahoma Community Property Act (1940)
2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 576.
66. Because of its "supposed thraldom and oppression" It was the inten-
tion .of the legislature "to cut forced heirship up by the roots." Hamilton v.
Flinn, 21 Tex. 713, 718 (1858).
67. Tex. Stat. (Vernon, 1936) art. 8282.
68. See infra at text supported by notes 123-130.
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LOUISIANA
Louisiana 9 was first colonized in about 1700 and the original
settlers came from France. From the very start the country was
governed under royal charters which extended the Laws and
the Custom of Paris to the new territory, 0 and there can be no
doubt about the origin of forced heirship in Louisiana.
For over half a century these conditions continued without
interference, and the traditions of the French law were as much
a part of these people as of their cousins back in France. When
Louisiana was ceded to Spain in 1763 the inhabitants forcibly
ejected the Spaniards who came to establish the new govern-
ment. It was only by means of a military entry some six years
later that Spain actually asserted control over the country.
The debatable question of whether the French laws were
abolished 71 de jure or de facto by O'Reilly's Ordinances of 1769
is not of serious concern to the present inquiry because forced
heirship was equally emphasized in both French and Spanish 2
laws. For the details of the institution in the subsequent Louisi-
ana codifications, both French and Spanish sources were drawn
upon.
In 1801 Spain agreed to return Louisiana to France, but
even prior to the formal delivery on November 30, 1803, France
had secretly conveyed the territory to the United States. The
three weeks of Laussat's efforts to restore French dominion could
only have been a still-born gesture into which no breath of
life had been imparted. For the historical development of forced
heirship, this short interval may be disregarded. 71
69. The legal history of Louisiana has been the subject of many articles
and addresses, including: B. W. Dart, Introduction to Dart's Civil Code of
Louisiana (1932); H. P. Dart, Sources of the Civil Code of Louisiana (1911)
13 La. Bar Ass'n Rep. 21; W. K. Dart, History of the Louisiana Judicial
System, 1 La. Dig. (1917) 1; Howe, Studies in the Civil Law (1896); Saunders,
The Law of Louisiana, Introduction to Saunder's Civil Code (2 ed. 1909);
Tucker, Source Books of Louisiana Civil Law (1932) 6 Tulane L. Rev. 280;
Wigmore, Louisiana, The Study of Its Legal System (1916) 1 So. L. Q. 1.
70. E.g., the charter granted to Anthony Crozat in 1712 and the one
granted to the Western Company in 1718. Howe, op. cit. supra note 69, at
264 et seq.
71. Abolished: B. W. Dart, op. cit. supra note 69, at iii; not abolished:
Schmidt's Louisiana Law Journal (1841) vol. 1, no. 2, p. 98; (1842) vol. 1,
no. 4, pp. 23-28. See also Wigmore, supra note 69, at 3, n.4.
72. E.g., Las Siete Partidas, at 5.4.8, 6.1.17, 6.2.1, 6.7.10, 6.8.1,5. See text
supra pp. 54-56, supported by notes 48-54, and see also note 78, Infra.
73. It has sometimes been considered as the re-entering wedge which
permitted the first Louisiana codiflers to use the French Civil Code as their
model. B. W. Dart, op. cit. supra note 69, at iv. But see Lislet and Carleton,
Las Siete Partidas (Eng. transl. 1820) xxi, preface.
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Under American dominion, the conflict between the invad-
ing common law and the entrenched civil law broke into open
battle almost at once. Governor Claiborne and the new common
law lawyers recommended and tried to establish the common
law as it was known to the other states, but the stubborn ad-
herence to the civil law proved to have more than sufficient
resistance. The common law never really had an appreciable
chance of displacing it. The few newcomers made no showing
against the large numbers of established inhabitants, and even
in some of the prominent jurists who came from the east there
must have been traces of the strong sympathy for the civil law
which was then prevalent along the Atlantic seacoast.7'
The shock of the impact between the two rival systems of law
was rather severe but the real struggle was short-lived and de-
cisive. The powerful insistence on the civil law was sufficiently
general to retain in effect the laws which were in existence at
the time of the delivery to United States. It was left to the Ter-
ritory to straighten out the details and adjustments.
Codification and Revision
In 1806, the first legislature appointed commissioners to codi-
fy the existing laws. Although they made use of a draft, and
perhaps a copy of the final text, of the French Civil Code, they
naturally included a considerable amount of Spanish law. In
this compilation of 1808,75 the codifiers reiterated the old Span-
ish rules76 regarding the lgitime. A parent's donations either
inter vivos or mortis causa could not exceed one-fifth of his prop-
erty to the prejudice of his children, and those of a child could
not exceed one-third to the prejudice of the parents. The rules
and causes for disinheritance7 7 were also adopted from Spanish
sources.
78
However, when this first Code was revised in 1825, there
74. Pound, The Influence of French Law in America (1909) 3 Ill. L. Rev.
354; Pound, Pioneers and the Common Law (1920) 27 W. Va. L. Rev. 1, 5, 6;
Pound, Revival of Comparative Law (1930) 5 Tulane L. Rev. 1, 8, 9.
75. A Digest of the Civil Laws now in force in the Territory of Orleans,
with alterations and amendments adapted to its present system of govern-
ment (La. Civil Code of 1808) 111.2.19, p. 212. White v. Holsten, 4 Mart. (O.S.)
471, 475 (La. 1816).
76. 3 Barrachina, op. cit. supra note 48, at 496; Esriche, loc. cit. supra
note 48; Fuero Juzgo, 4.5.1; Fuero Real, 3.5.10, 3.12.7. See Gregorio Lopez,
loc. cit. supra note 48; Schmidt, The Civil Law of Spain and Mexico (1851)
207. See also the discussion of Spanish law at text supported by notes 48-54,
supra. Cf. the original rules of forced heirship in Texas, note 55, supra.
77. La. Civil Code of 1808, 111.2.127, p. 236.
78. Las Siete Partidas 6.17.1-11.
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were adopted the amendments proposed by the commissioners 9
that the disposable portion be increased and that-in keeping
with the French Civil Code'Q--it be graduated in accordance
with the number of children. It was thus enacted that:
"Donations inter vivos or mortis causa cannot exceed two-
thirds of the property of the disposer, if he leaves at his
decease, a legitimate child; one-half, if he leaves two chil-
dren; and one-third, if he leaves a greater number."81
At the same time, the original Spanish rules of disinheritance
were retained.8 2
These provisions were carried over into the Revised Civil
Code of 1870,88 and now form part of the current law of the state.
Forced Heirship in Operation
Many of the issues which have to be dealt with in the ap-
plication of the principles of forced heirship were anticipated and
provided for by the Civil Code, and the courts have worked out
solutions for the others. A few of these will be briefly indicated.
As in both French and Spanish law, excessive dispositions
are not null, but are reducible to the disposable quantum. 84 How-
ever, where a donor legally revokes a gift and then sells the
property, the vendee cannot be sued for any reduction because
through revocation the gift is deemed never to have been made.85
And since a remunerative donation is really a dation en paiement
for services rendered, it is assimilated to a sale and is not subject
to reduction either. 86
The child's cause of action for the collation8 7 of benefits
79. Additions and Amendments to the Civil Code of Louisiana (Projet
of 1822) Book III, tit. 2, reason for the amendment of Art. 19: "D'aprds le
voeu gdndralement manifestd de laisser aux pdres plus de ibertd dans la
disposition de leurs biens, nous avons augment6 considdrablement la portion
disponible" (official French version, p. 208); "We have increased consider-
ably the disposable portion in consequence of the general wish in favor
of parents having more liberty in the disposition of their property" (official
English version, p. 201). Reprinted in 1 La. Legal Archives (1938) 207.
80. Art. 913, French Civil Code.
81. Art. 1480, La. Civil Code of 1825.
82. Art. 1609 et seq. La. Civil Code of 1825.
83. Art. 1493 et seq., 1617 et seq., La. Civil Code of 1870.
84. Art. 1502 et seq., La. Civil Code of 1870. Succession of Moore, 40 La.
Ann. 531, 4 So. 460 (1888); Cox v. Von Ahlefeldt, 50 La. Ann. 1266, 23 So. 959
(1898); Succession of Barth, 178 La. 847, 152 So. 543 (1934); Succession of
Smith, 182 La. 389, 162 So. 21 (1935).
85. Abes v. Davis, 46 La. Ann. 818, 15 So. 178 (1894).
86. Succession of Henry, 158 La. 516, 104 So. 310 (1925).
87. Art. 1227 et seq., La. Civil Code of 1870.
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received by other heirs, and for the reduction8 8 of excessive dis-
position arises only after the death of the ancestor, and is sub-
jected to a prescription of five years.8 9 This right is personal
to the forced heir, his heirs and assigns; his creditors cannot
avail themselves of it. However, anything amounting to con-
firmation or ratification of the ancestor's acts must preclude the
forced heir from contesting them. 1 The heir's right can also
be exercised to attack simulated or fraudulent contracts of the
ancestor.'2 A rather interesting question arose when the court
had to determine whether the action for reduction could be
exercised against a gift which the parent had made before his
marriage, but since the texts make no exception for the gifts
of an unmarried person it was held that they must be subject to
reduction just as any others.93
One of the problems which gave rise to some controversy
in France was eliminated neatly by the codal provision-in-
corporating the view which ultimately prevailed in the interpre-
tation of the French Civil Code-that "the part of those who
renounce goes to those who accept.""
The Louisiana Civil Code has also provided that an adopted
child is entitled to the l6gitime but he cannot interfere with the
rights of other forced heirs (legitimate children and parents of
the adopter). 5 The illegitimate child is not a forced heir and,
especially in the presence of other surviving close relatives, is
88. Art. 1502 et seq., La. Civil Code of 1870.
89. Art. 3542, La. Civil Code of 1870. Succession of Waterman, 183 La.
1006, 165 So. 182 (1936).
90. Art. 1504, La. Civil Code of 1870. Tompkins v. Prentice, 12 La. Ann.
465 (1857); Brant v. Terrill, 141 So. 837 (La. App. 1932).
91. Art. 2274, La. Civil Code of 1870. Succession of Harris, 179 La. 954,
155 So. 446 (1934). Cross, A Treatise on Successions (1891) 147, § 97.
92. Art. 2239, La. Civil Code of 1870. Croizet's Heirs v. Gaudet, 6 Mart.
(O.S.) 524 (La. 1819); Bauman v. Pennywell, 160 La. 555, 107 So. 425 (1926).
93. Guidry v. Calre, 181 La. 895, 160 So. 622 (1935), citing with approval
Tessier v. Roussel, 41 La. Ann. 474, 6 So. 542, 824 (1889) and Griffith v.
Alcocke, 113 La. 514, 37 So. 47 (1904); and citing with disapproval the lan-
guage used in Woolverton v. Stevenson, 52 La. Ann. 1147, 27 So. 674 (1900)
and Grasser v. Blank, 110 La. 493, 34 So. 648 (1903). But see Cross, op. cit.
supra note 91, at 138, § 91.
94. Art. 1498, La. Civil Code of 1870; Art. 1485, La. Civil Code of 1825,
incorporating an amendment proposed by the Projet of 1822, official French
version, p. 208, official English version, p. 202, reprinted in 1 La. Legal
Archives (1938) 207.
95. Art 214, La. Civil Code of 1870. Succession of Hawkins, 139 La. 228,
71 So. 492 (1916); Succession of Dielman, 155 La. 496, 99 So. 416 (1924). See
also Comment (1938) 1 LoUISIANA LAW REVEW 196, 199-201. In Alexander v.
Gray, 181 So. 639, 644 (La. App. 1938), there Is dictum to the effect that In
the presence of other forced heirs an adopted child is also entitled to a
ldgitime but that it must be taken from the disposable portion.
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even under an incapacity to receive, in any manner, more than a
small part of the parent's estate.16
Closely related to the present problem is the codal provision
which causes the revocation of a will by the subsequent birth of
a legitimate child. A recent judgment concluded that, in the light
of its historical development in Louisiana, the rule did not apply
to the case of an adoption.9 7 Furthermore, the court justly criti-
cized an earlier liberal interpretation 8 which had applied the
article where a child born prior to the making of the will had
subsequently thereto been legitimated by the marriage of its
parents.
In the matter of inheritance by ascendants, there is a glaring
inconsistency between the rule of forced heirship" which as-
sures one-third of the estate to a surviving parent in default of
descendants, and the rule of intestate succession"° which entitles
a single surviving parent to only one-fourth of the estate in the
presence of decedent's brothers or sisters. Considering that the
forced heir's right to demand a reduction should not exceed the
amount of prejudice caused by such liberalities to the rights he
would have had in their absence, the parent's claim "has been
limited to the intestate share of one-fourth. 1 '
The surviving spouse is not a forced heir, but is provided
for in other ways. There are the rights to one-half of the com-
96. Arts. 1483-1488, La. Civil Code of 1870.
97. Succession of McRacken, 162 La. 443, 110 So. 645 (1926), interpreting
Art. 1705, La. Civil Code of 1870, which is not found in the French Civil Code
but which was taken from Spanish sources (Las Siete Partidas, 6.1.20).
This rule is based on the reasonable presumption that a testator would
not have given his property to others if he had foreseen that he would
afterwards have offspring. Lewis v. Hare, 8 La. Ann. 378 (1853). Conse-
quently, a will does not fall if it contains provisions for such an after-born
child. Succession of Carbajal, 154 La. 1060, 98 So. 666 (1923). Cf. Titche, The
Right of Testamentary Disposition in favor of a Posthumous Child (1917)
2 So. L. Q. 210.
98. Succession of Caballero v. The Executor, 24 La. Ann. 573 (1872).
99. Art. 1494, La. Civil Code of 1870.
100. Art. 911 (par. 2), La. Civil Code of 1870.
101. Succession of Greenlaw, 148 La. 255, 86 So. 786 (1920), containing a
review of prior conflicting decisions, and approved in Succession of Dielman,
155 La. 496, 99 So. 416 (1924); Succession of Bush, 158 La. 1000, 105 So. 42
(1925); Shimshak v. Cox, 166 La. 102, 116 So. 714 (1928). The concurring
opinion of Judge Dawkins (86 So. at 797) that the rules of forced heirship
should come into operation only when liberalities have exceeded the dispos-
able portion seems to be rather sound, and a solution to the problem could
be worked out on the basis of this principle without any modification of
the texts.
For a discussion of the details of this problem, See Comment (1933) 7
Tulane L. Rev. 259. For a proposed amendment to Article 1494 fixing the
fractions in accord with Article 911, see Lazarus, The Disposable Portion
and the Legitime (1941) 1 Loyola L. Rev. 69, 73.
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munity property,1 2 the needy spouse's marital portion (one-
fourth) of a rich estate,103 and the widow's (and children's) privi-
leged claim to one thousand dollars from an insolvent estate.
10 4
A forced heir may be deprived of his lgitime by a judicial
pronouncement of unworthiness to inherit (for recognized rea-
sons),° ' or by the testator's formal exercise of the power of dis-
inheritance (for the "just causes" specified).106 To be effective, a
disinhersion must satisfy a number of requirements: it must be
nominatim and specifically expressed by the testator in his will,
and the just cause alleged by him must be proved after his
death by the other heirs. Evidently, disinhersion is not at all
favored.0 7 Furthermore, wherever possible the courts have been
inclined to render ineffective the testator's attempts to disin-
herit his children.10 8 The public policy of forced heirship is so
strong'09 that even an agreement by the forced heir to relinquish
his claim for the l6gitime is not binding upon him.1 0
Another indication of the solicitous attitude towards forced
heirship is found in Article 1710 which provides that "no charges
or conditions can be imposed by the testator on the legitimate
portion of forced heirs.""' By reason of this article, the court has
ruled that the lgitime cannot be subjected to a usufruct,"12 ex-
cept of course the usufruct of the surviving spouse on the dece-
dent's half of the community under Article 916.11
102. Art. 2406, La. Civil Code of 1870.
103. Art. 2382, La. Civil Code of 1870.
104. Art. 3252, La. Civil Code of 1870.
105. Art. 964 et seq., La. Civil Code of 1870. It is necessary to have the
quality of heir in order to claim the l~gitime. Cross, op. cit. supra note 91,
at 137, § 90.
106. Art. 1617 et seq., La. Civil Code of 1870. Pennywell v. George, 164
La. 630, 114 So. 493 (1927); Walet v. Darby, 167 La. 1095, 120 So. 869 (1929);
Winbarg v. Winbarg, 177 La. 1071, 150 So. 21 (1933).
107. Succession of Reems, 134 La. 1033, 64 So. 898 (1914).
108. Daggett, General Principles of Succession on Death in Civil Law
(1937) 11 Tulane L. Rev. 399, 403, and cases cited in n. 23-26.
109. Cf. Marcenaro v. Mordella, 10 La. Ann. 772 (1855).
110. Hoggatt v. Gibbs, 12 La. Ann. 770 (1857).
111. Art. 1710, La. Civil Code of 1870. This article was introduced in La.
Civil Code of 1808, 111.2.198, p. 252. See Succession of Turnell, 32 La. Ann.
1218 (1880).
112. Clarkson v. Clarkson, 13 La. Ann. 422 (1858); Succession of Turnell,
32 La. Ann. 1218 (1880).
113. Art. 916, La. Civil Code of 1870: "In all cases, when the predeceased
husband or wife shall have left issue of the marriage with the survivor, and
shall not have disposed by last will and testament, of his or her share in
the community property, the survivor shall hold a usufruct, during his or
her natural life, so much of the share of the deceased In such community
property as may be inherited by such issue. This usufruct shall cease, how-
ever, whenever the survivor shall enter into a second marriage."
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The rules which govern the question of subjecting the l6gi-
time to a condition of indivision are a little involved. The general
rule of Article 1710 is modified by Article 1301 which expressly
provides that it is permissible to impose a condition of indivision
during minority. But it has been held that Article 1300114 cannot
be interpreted to permit imposing such a condition on the forced
portions of major heirs.115 In Succession of Turnell"1 the court
maintained that such a condition was improper and therefore
permitted the forced heirs to obtain immediate possession of
their l6gitime. The recent trust acts of 1920 and 1938 added an-
other facet to this question. Act 107 of 1920117 provided specifi-
cally that a settler could subject the l6gitime to a trust in favor
of the forced heir, and this was upheld in Wilbert v. Wilbert."'
Although this statute was repealed in 1935,119 the same position
was embodied in a new trust estates act of 1938120 and is really
a direct departure from Article 1710.
The Sanctification of Forced Heirship in Louisiana
In view of the French and Spanish background, it is obvious
that forced heirship should have been among the original basic
institutions of Louisiana civil law. It is much less obvious how-
ever that-during many generations and throughout tremendous
social, economic and political changes-the institution of forced
heirship should have retained its place of importance in the legal
system. To the people of Louisiana, this seemed perfectly natural.
But in the light of an extensive comparative perspective, the
phenomenon appears exceptional. In several legal systems the
civil law principle of forced heirship had come into contact with
the common law principle of testamentary freedom. With the
114. Art. 1300, La. Civil Code of 1870: "But a donor or testator can order
that the effects given or bequeathed by him, be not divided for a certain
time, or until the happening of a certain condition.
"But If the time fixed exceed five years, or if the condition do not hap-
pen within that term, from the day of the donation or of the opening of the
succession, the judge, at the expiration of this term of five years, may
order that partition, if it is proved to him that the coheirs can not agree
among themselves, or differ as to the administration of the common effects."
115. Succession of Manion, 143 La. 799, 79 So. 409 (1918); Succession of
Manson, 168 La. 286, 121 So. 868 (1929).
116. 32 La. Ann. 1218 (1880).
117. La. Act 107 of 1920, § 1.
118. 155 La. 197, 99 So. 36 (1923); followed in Succession of Manthey, 159
La. 743, 106 So. 289 (1925).
119. Act 7 of 1935 (3 E.S.).
120. La. Act 81 of 1938, § 3 [Dart's Stats. (1940) § 9850.31. See Nabors, The
Shortcomings of the Louisiana Trust Estates Act (1989) 13 Tulane L. Rev.
178, 204.
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exception of Louisiana and Scotland, 12 1 the freedom of disposition
had prevailed even where some or most of the other basic civil
law institutions had stood their ground.
The steps in this process as it happened in Texas have been
described above: 122 forced heirship was abolished while the civil
law institution of community property was retained.
In Quebec the struggle between the two modern systems of
law was a very bitter one. The result was a complete victory for
the civil law. However, on one main issue the common law pre-
vailed and that was in the abolition of forced heirship by the
introduction of full and absolute freedom of testamentary dispo-
sition.123
Likewise, in the further flung instances of conflict between
the civil law and the common law, this issue was finally resolved
in favor of the liberty of testation.
In South Africa, the Roman-Dutch law'2 4 contained the rules
of the later Roman codifications on the subjects of disinhersion,
the legitimate portion, the querela inofficiosi testamenti, the falci-
dian and trebellian portions. Thus, four or fewer children were
entitled to one-third, and five or more to one-half, of what they
121. "In Scottish law the legal rights of the surviving spouse and chil-
dren still conform to the tripartite principle which operated under the
mediaeval law of England. .. . According to this principle, one third of a
man's free movable estate goes to the surviving children (legitim) and one
third to the widow (jus relictae); if only one or the other survives, the
fraction is fixed at one half. In 1881 the woman's estate was likewise sub-
jected to these claims in favor of the surviving children and widower (jus
relicti). In addition, the widow enjoys the right of terce, which is a life-
rent on one-third of the husband's heritable estate, and is based on the
obligation of a landed proprietor to provide for his widow in keeping with
his circumstances and condition in life. The husband's counterpart of this
right is called courtesy, and extends over the whole of the wife's heritable
estate." Dainow, Limitations on Testamentary Freedom in England (1940)
25 Corn. L. Q. 337, 344, n. 44. See Enclyclopedia of the Laws of Scotland
(Green, 1930) vo. Legitim, vol. 9, p. 133 et seq.; vo. Terce, vol. 14, p. 386
et seq.; vo. Courtesy, vol. 5, p. 44; vo. Collation, vol. 3, p. 476 et seq.; Gloag
and Henderson, Introduction to the Law of Scotland (2 ed. 1933) 39, p. 480
et seq.; 1 McLaren, The Law of Scotland in Relation to Wills and Successions
(1868) 117 et seq.; Bell, Principles of the Law of Scotland (10 ed. 1899)
615 et seq.
122. See discussion supra at pp. 56-57.
123. Although the Quebec Civil Code did retain the dower rights of
children as a counter balance to the loss of their lgitime, the practice has
been to nullify dower so that testamentary freedom is really complete and
absolute. For full discussion see Dainow, Unrestricted Testation in Quebec
(1936) 10 Tulane L. Rev. 401.
124. 3 Manfred Nathan, The Common Law of South Africa (1906) 1859,
citing Voet, 28, 2, §§ 1-14; 1 Van Leeuwen, Commentaries on Roman-Dutch
Law (transl. by Kotze 1921) 345, 452, 413; Lee, An Introduction to Roman-
Dutch Law (3 ed. 1931) 362 et seq.
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would otherwise have inherited on intestacy. For more than half
a century after the English acquisition of this territory (1814)
these laws remained unchanged, but under English influences "the
pull toward the despotic authority of the property owner"'125 was
so strong that all restrictions on testamentary disposition-not
only the l6gitime of children, but also the falcidian and trebellian
portions of the instituted heir-were completely abolished by
legislation. Natal was the first to make the departure in 1863; the
Cape followed in 1874; Orange Free State (Orange River Colony)
and Transvaal withstood the change until 1901 and 1902 respec-
tively.128
In Ceylon, there was no express abolition but it is interesting
to note that the restrictions on testation simply dropped out of
existence by implication from non-use.
27
In British Guiana, a rather determined effort to save the legi-
timate portion of children was made by a law of 1909, but it was
impossible to keep this curb on the individual's rights of owner-
ship, and the freedom of testation received legislative sanction in
1916. 12
From these indications of the same reaction in various parts
of the British Empire, 29 it might appear that-even where the
general system of the civil law survived the conflict-there was
some irresistible relationship between modern economic and
social progress and the assertion of property rights to the ulti-
mate degree.12 0 In comparison with what happened to forced heir-
125. McMurray, vo. Successions, 14 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences
(1934) 436, 438.
126. Natal, Law 22 of 1863, § 3; Law 7 of 1885, §§ 1, 2. Cape, Act 23 of
1874, § 2; Act 26 of 1873, § 1 (falcidian and trebellian portions). Orange Free
State, Law Book of 1901, c. 92, §§ 2, 3. Transvaal, Proclamation 28 of 1902,
§§ 126, 128. 3 Manfred Nathan, op. cit. supra note 124, at 1848, 1860, 1916; Lee,
op. cit. supra note 124, at 364; Hoeck, Die Testierfreiheit und ihre Beschr~in-
kungen im Britischen Reich (1933) 38.
127. Lee, op. cit. supra note 124, at 364; Hoeck, op. cit. supra note 126, at
38; both citing 2 Thompson, Institutes of the Laws of Ceylon, 208.
128. British Guiana, Deceased Persons Estates Ordinance, no. 9 of 1909,
§ 4; abolished by the Civil Law of British Guiana Ordinance, no. 15 of 1916,
§ 7. Lee, op. cit. supra note 124, at 364; Hoeck, op. cit. supra note 126, at 38.
129. The Channel Islands of Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney and Sark seem
to have remained a part of the old world unto themselves, unaffected by the
newer English influences. Thus, they retained the traditions of the Custom
of Normandy with slight modification: that a testator who leaves surviving
children (and a widow) can dispose of only one-third of his movable prop-
erty. See Lee, The Civil Law and the Common Law (1915) 14 Mich. L. Rev.
89, 92; 1 Le Geyt, Manuscrits Sur La Constitution, les Lois et les Usages de
l'ile de Jersey (1846) 131, 134; Escarra, La Succession aux Biens Reels dans
les coutumes Anglo-Normandes (1903) 337 et seq.
130. It is very interesting and significant that in many parts of the
British empire there has been expressed very recently the phenomenon of
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ship in the other instances of conflict with the common law prin-
ciple of testamentary freedom, it would have been unexpected
that in only one or two jurisdictions it should survive. It may be
somewhat surprising therefore, that the institution should have
commanded such continued respect in Louisiana.
Much more to be marvelled at, however, is the coup de grace
that came in 1921-more than a century after the first codifica-
tion of Louisiana civil law. The attachment to this legal system
and the appreciation of it resulted in making almost sacred cer-
tain institutions which were characteristic and symbolic of the
civil law.
In the constitutional convention of 1921, there was introduced
"An ordinance relative to the limitation of legislative powers."''1 1
The sponsors of this proposal represented the deep-rooted and
widespread sentiment that looked with disfavor upon the infiltra-
tion of common law doctrines and the displacement of civil law
principles. The fact that trusts had just been introduced into
Louisiana law 132 was regarded as demonstrating a lack of appre-
ciation of the fundamental social and economic values of the long
standing tradition which prohibited substitutions and fideicom-
missa.13 3 That such notions were even harbored by some people
was a matter of serious concern to others who felt that something
had to be done. Thus the main part of the proposed Ordinance
related to the prohibition against trusts, and to this was linked a
provision safeguarding forced heirship. The combination would
continue to prevent the accumulation of excessively large for-
tunes, and that is how the two things came to be together in the
a new and totally opposite development returning to limitations of testa-
mentary freedom. See Dainow, Limitations on Testamentary Freedom in
England (1940) 25 Corn. L. Q. 337; Dainow, Restricted Testation in New
Zealand, Australia and Canada (1938) 36 Mich. L. Rev. 1107.
131. Ordinance No. 305, "An Ordinance relative to the limitation of
legislative powers" introduced by Mr. Sidney Herold and worded as follows in
the original proposal: "No law shall be passed abolishing the principle of
forced heirship or legalizing substitutions or fidei commissa or trusts affect-
ing immovable property. Note. This is intended as a new article, there being
none on the subject in the present constitution." Official Journal of the Pro-
ceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Louisiana (1921)
274.
132. La. Act 107 of 1920 had introduced a limited trust.
133. Art. 1520, La. Civil Code of 1870. Clague's Widow v. Clague's Execu-
tors, 13 La. 1 (1838); Ducloslange v. Ross, 3 La. Ann. 432 (1848); Baulieu v.
Ternoir, 5 La. Ann. 476 (1850); Succession of Franklin v. Franklin, 7 La. Ann.
395 (1852); Partee v. Succession of Hill, 12 La. Ann. 767 (1857); Succession
of McCan, 48 La. Ann. 145, 19 So. 220 (1895); Succession of Beauregard, 49
La. Ann. 1176, 22 So. 348 (1897). See Nabors, Restrictions upon the Owner-
ship of Property in Louisiana (1929) 4 Tulane L. Rev. 1, 190.
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same proposal.1 '8 The original text of the Ordinance 18 5 would have
barred trusts altogether, but in the end a compromise was reached
approving a specially limited use of the trust device. 138 How-
134. A direct and interesting light is thrown upon this matter in a
personal communication to the writer from the sponsor of the proposal,
Mr. Sidney L. Herold. With his permission the following excerpt is re-
produced:
"Many years ago, I read a lecture by Charles E. Fenner.... The general
subject was the danger in a democracy of the accumulation of tremendous
fortunes. The remedy which he pointed out was two-fold: the abolition of
trusts, and the institution of the principles of forced heirship and the
equality of heirs. All of these, he pointed out, were necessary to break
up tremendous family fortunes."
The philosophy of the matter was more fully discussed by Mr. Herold
in a recent address as follows:
"The most remarkable of the economic principles enunciated in the
Civil Code, however, deals with the very current problem of the maldistri-
bution of wealth and its unhealthy accumulation. Mindful of the evils in-
herent in great wealth, of the inconsistency of plutocratic power in a
democracy, one of the great purposes of the Code is the prevention of this
disease. The strict provisions of the Code governing the right of testa-
mentary disposition, in the institution of the doctrine of forced heirship
and its elaborate provisions insuring equality of heirs, all flow from the
same desire of obviating the possibility of the passing of great estates into
single hands. The provision of the Code prohibiting fldei commissa and
substitutions-that is to say, the prohibition of trust estates-was likewise
designed to keep in commerce the flow of wealth incident on death.
"So primogeniture, entailment, trust, and every other form through
which fortunes might be held intact despite death are interdicted by the
Civil Code of Louisiana. The agency of death thus performs its normal
function-it releases the grasp of the possessor over worldly accumula-
tion. It distributes, vests ownership and right of untrammeled disposition,
breaks up the estate, and thus gives full play to the natural rule expressed
in the homely proverb that it is but three generations from shirt-sleeves to
shirt-sleeves. Thus the law does not stunt the natural instinct of acquisition
nor interfere with the normal desire to accumulate for one's own posterity.
It does not seek to confiscate nor to destroy. It simply says to the indi-
vidual: 'You have no natural right to retain the dead hand on your fortune.
You must distribute and distribute in full ownership.'
"Manifold provisions occur in the law to prevent the defeat of this end
by subterfuge. Simulated transfers may be defeated by parol evidence. And
most elaborate provisions with respect to collation (hotchpot) are provided,
by which the heir may demand and secure equal distribution of the ances-
tor's estate.
"These three-forced heirship, equality of heirs, prevention of trusts-
together form a system of protection of democracy from too powerful
wealth, which, if they had been in effect in the nation from the period of
the intensive industrial development since the Civil War, would have ob-
viated the evils now sought to be remedied by more drastic means by
national authority." Handbook of the Association of American Law Schools
for 1935, 84, 88-89.
Cf. Daggett, General principles of Succession on Death in Civil Law
(1937) 11 Tulane L. Rev. 399, 400, 401: "Forced heirship is a central thought
In the civilian law of successions;" It "remains a bulwark of equality for
the family and is a known and accepted method for wealth distribution."
135. See note 131, supra.
136. As amended, the Ordinance approved the principle of the 1920 trust
act and reads as follows: "No law shall be passed abolishing the principle
of forced heirship or legalizing substitutions or fidei commissa or trust
estates; except that the legislature may authorize the creation of trusts
1941] FORCED HEIRSHIP
ever, on the other issue no concession was made, and as finally
adopted'" the new constitutional provision 8' declared that "no
law shall be passed abolishing forced heirship." The importance
of this institution was thereby recognized and its continuance
assilred in the life of the people.
for a period of not exceeding ten years after the death of the donor which
may be made where a natural person is the direct beneficiary to run from
the date of his majority; and provided further that this prohibition shall
not apply in respect of donations strictly for educational, charitable or
religious purposes." Official Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention of the State of Louisiana (1921) 624.
The Committee on Coordination reworded the Ordinance so as to clarify
the language without making any change in the substance. (Id. at 867, 981.)
This brought the proposal to the text which was finally adopted'as Article
IV, Section 16 of the 1921 Constitution. See note 138, infra.
The 1920 trust act was repealed by La. Act 7 of 1935 (3 E.S.); but a new
trust estates act was reintroduced by La. Act 81 of 1938.
137. For the detailed outline of the legislative history of this ordinance
in the constitutional convention of 1921, see Official Journal, Index to
Ordinances, at 66-67.
138. La Const. of 1921, Art. IV, § 16. "No law shall be passed abolishing
forced heirship or authorizing the creation of substitutions, fidei commissa
or trust estates; except that the Legislature may authorize the creation of
trust estates for a period not exceeding ten years after the death of the
donor; provided that where a natural person is the direct beneficiary said
period may be made to extend until ten years after his majority; and pro-
vided further, that this prohibition as to trust estates or fidei commissa shall
not apply to donations strictly for educational, charitable or religious pur-
poses."
